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MISSION COMMAND:
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to
a Collectivist Model
Anthony C. King
©2017 Anthony C. King

ABSTRACT: This article specifies the distinctive character of mission command in the twenty-first century by examining the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis. These examples
contrast the historical attention to immediate tactical tasks with
today’s application, which involves a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across echelons so that decisions are
closely aligned.

A

dopted in the 1980s, mission command is the dominant
command philosophy in American and, indeed, Western
armed forces. US Army doctrine states “mission command
is one of the foundations of unified land operations. This philosophy
of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to
take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to
achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Mission command
emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined
initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment.”1
By empowering subordinates to take local decisions in line with a
superior’s intent, mission command accelerates decision-making while
simultaneously maintaining operational unity. It is therefore seen as an
optimal solution on a complex, fast-moving battlefield.
Originally developed by German General Helmuth von Moltke the
elder based upon German military traditions, mission command reached
fruition with Oskar von Hutier’s stormtroop tactics in the First World
War and the Wehrmacht’s Auftragstaktik in the Second World War.2 It
is noticeable that studies of the Wehrmacht’s operations, in particular,
informed the formal introduction of mission command into Western
military doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s.3 While accepting the importance
of historical precedents, however, it is also widely recognized that mission
command today is not a mere imitation of twentieth-century practices.
Operational, organizational, and technological transformations have
ensured that—while continuities are certainly observable, especially
at the level of principles—the actual practice of mission command is
necessarily distinctive today. Mission command has evolved.
1 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Mission Command, Army Doctrinal
Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1.
2 Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–18 (New York:
Praeger, 1989); and Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third
Reich (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 2005).
3 John T. Nelsen II, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters 17, no. 3
(September 1987).
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This article argues the doctrine of mission command in the twentieth
century referred to a very limited devolution of authority relating to
immediate tactical tasks. By contrast, mission command today does not
involve mere local, individual initiative but rather a deep and enduring
interdependence between commanders across levels. Decisions are
not simply devolved, as they were in the past, but collectively aligned
and coordinated across and within echelons to ensure the coherence
of the entire network. Mission command in the twenty-first century
involves a new level of organizational integration requiring intense,
professionalized teamwork between commanders. This article examines
the legend and reality of mission command in the twentieth century
and tries to demonstrate the distinctiveness of contemporary practices
through an examination of the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and
James Mattis.

Mission Command in the Twentieth Century

In his work on mission command, Martin van Creveld contrasts
the practices of the imperial German army with those of the British
Expeditionary Force. He describes the latter as “the most extreme a
form as can be found” where “carefully laid plans rigorously and
undeviatingly carried out are regarded as the one way to overcome the
inevitable confusion of the battlefield.”4 The German army, by contrast,
developed a highly decentralized system, which “sought to extend
the spirit of free cooperation from the highest levels.”5 Subordinate
commanders were given minimum objectives and then encouraged to
improvise. Significantly, van Creveld highlights the individualism at the
heart of this system, citing 1906 regulations: “Combat demands thinking,
independent leaders and troops, capable of independent action.” Even
more tellingly, van Creveld cites a key sentence from the 1908 regulations:
“From the youngest solders upward, the total independent commitment
of all physical and mental forces is to be demanded.”6 For van Creveld,
German mission command was a decentralized, individualistic system
in which, in order to respond to the confusion of battle, subordinate
commanders were given freedom to act as they personally saw fit in
relation to their immediate circumstances.
This argument has been very influential and, indeed, reproduced
almost exactly in the most recent works on mission command from
such authors as Eitan Shamir.7 He traces the evolution of mission
command from the initial approach of Prussian Frederick the Great
through the von Hutier “stormtroop” tactics in the First World War.
Moreover, his discussion of Helmuth von Moltke the elder is important
to understanding traditional concepts of mission command.8 Although
von Moltke planned campaigns carefully with his general staff, he
understood that once in battle, unexpected situations would arise.
Shamir notes “No discussion of Moltke’s style of command would
be complete without the extraordinary description of him lying on a sofa
4 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 166.
5 Ibid., 169.
6 Ibid., 170.
7 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli
Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
8 Ibid., 36–41.
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calmly reading book while the army mobilized to fight Austria.” Indeed,
J. F. C. Fuller claimed that von Moltke “abdicated his command.”9 Yet,
the scale of operations and the limitations of communications prevented
von Moltke from exercising direct command over his forces; laissezfaire was required. Consequently, having designed the campaign, von
Moltke was forced to give his subordinate army commanders almost
total license to operate independently in any crisis; they would be out
of communication at decisive moments. Decision-making was not so
much aligned as consciously decentralized. Local commanders acted by
reference to their intuition in the light of their immediate situation.
Communications had improved enormously by the Second World
War, but with mechanization, so had the pace of battle.10 Consequently,
the Wehrmacht adopted a similarly individualist, Moltkean model of
mission command where local commanders were empowered to act
independently in broad reference to their senior commanders: “It has
always been a particular forte of German leadership to grant wide scope
to the self-dependence of subordinate commanders. . . . Generally,
the German high commanders rarely or never reproached their
subordinates unless they made a terrible blunder.”11 Shamir admits that
in the course of the Second World War, Auftragstaktik (mission-tactics
command) suffered a decline. But he explains the German method of
mission command was, perhaps, the central factor in Germany’s combat
effectiveness in World War II: “Its de-centralised tradition facilitated
organized and effective resistance even while the supreme command
had all but collapsed.”12
Karl-Heinz Frieser’s work on the legend of blitzkrieg supports
Shamir’s argument.13 While blitzkrieg was invented more or less by
accident in 1940, mission command allowed local commanders to
act on their initiative in response to their immediate circumstances
without consideration or knowledge of the wider situation—for
instance, as commander of 7th Panzer Division during the invasion
of France, Erwin Rommel “explored new paths in the command of
a Panzer Division,” which has been taken as the exemplar of mission
command.14 Significantly, at the Meuse, Avesnes, and Arras, he acted
all but independently of his corps and army commanders, Generals
Hermann Hoth and Hans von Kluge, who often had little idea of his
location. Indeed, Shimon Naveh has described Rommel’s method as
“sheer opportunism.”15 In the German army, Rommel was certainly
extreme, and other panzer commanders, such as Hermann Balck, were
less cavalier in their application of classic mission command involving
ad hoc improvisation in a highly decentralized system.
9 Ibid., 41.
10 Ibid., 50.
11 Ibid., 50.
12 Ibid., 52.
13 Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2005).
14 Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend; Kenneth Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns (New York: Da Capo
Press, 1997); Claus Telp, “Rommel and 1940,” in Rommel Reconsidered, ed. Ian Beckett (Mechanicsburg,
PA: Stackpole, 2014); Desmond Young, Rommel (London: Collins, 1950); Ronald Lewin, Rommel as
Military Commander (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2003); and Dennis Showalter, Patton and
Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005), 200.
15 Shamir, Transforming Command, 51.

10

Parameters 47(1) Spring 2017

Jorg Muth makes a commensurate argument in his recent work
on officer education in the American and German armies before
the Second World War.16 He compares West Point unfavorably with
equivalent German officer training. Right up to the 1940s, West Point
instituted a crude pedagogy in which students learned only boorishness
and conformity. Individualism was explicitly extirpated from the
officer candidates as the US Army strove to impose discipline and a
wooden respect for military hierarchy in its students. By contrast, the
German army sought not simply to train its officers but genuinely
to educate them. It sought to create knowledgeable and questioning
individuals capable of creativity, flexibility, and adaptation. Against the
Prussian stereotype, German officer training created thinking soldiers,
encouraged to assert themselves and to improvise, not mere automatons.
In the work of all these scholars, then, traditional twentieth-century
mission command is understood to be an individualistic practice based
on independence and intuition.

Mission Command in the 21st Century

Scholars have identified the character of mission command in
the twentieth century in detail. They have also recognized a revision
of mission command today acknowledged in discussions of the Israel
Defense Force and its recent operations. In conventional operations
up until 1973, simple devolved mission command worked well for the
IDF. Then, an individualistic doctrine proved effective. On the basis
of it, the IDF developed a highly pragmatic officer class, oriented to
practice and to experience, not to theory.17 The IDF operated on an ad
hoc personal basis. In the twenty-first century in Lebanon, the West
Bank, and Gaza, however, this system of mission command has become
increasingly inadequate. As war has become more complex and Israel’s
enemies more sophisticated, “it has now become clear that the practical
soldier is no longer enough.”18
In a recent article coauthored with Uzi Ben-Shalom, Shamir
draws a divide between classical twentieth-century mission command
and contemporary practice. For these authors, contemporary mission
command involves more than just Moltkean deregulation: “Mission
command require[s] a certain quality of education and a common
language.”19 Yet, the Israeli officer corps never developed a genuinely
professional ethos. The education of the IDF officer corps has always
been markedly inferior especially to their Western peers. Consequently,
“the result is something opposed to mission command, since
commanders operating in this spirit would act in accordance with their
own understanding—not the mission.”20 As an individualist practice,
the IDF has proved classical twentieth-century mission command is,
in fact, increasingly unsuited to the special demands of contemporary
16 Jorg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces,
1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2013).
17 Avi Kober, “What Happened to Israeli Military Thought,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 5
(2011): 708, doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.561109.
18 Ibid., 723.
19 Ibid., 111.
20 Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir, “Mission Command between Theory and Practice: The
Case of the IDF,” Defense & Security Analysis 27, no. 2 (2011): 112, doi:10.1080/14751798.2011
.578715.
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operations. Indeed, in many cases, the IDF have descended into directive,
centralized command of the most extreme type as they lose faith in their
own mission command system.
With his discussion of the IDF, Shamir implies the practice of
mission command today has evolved considerably. While he is aware of
these changes, however, he does not define the term with any precision,
especially in relation to Western forces. Indeed, Shamir’s monograph
mainly focuses on the failure of British and American forces to
implement mission command on operations in the last three decades,
preferring long established dirigiste systems. Similarly, although Jorg
Muth focuses on the prewar period, he adopts a compatible position.
He simply assumes the American Army is still committed to a directive
command system. Scholars have, therefore, recognized that mission
command is in transition, but they do not examine their evidence in
sufficient depth to define the scale or the character of the change.
In fact, mission command no longer refers to mere devolution
and individual license typical in the twentieth century but to the evercloser integration and interdependence of commanders. Crucially,
mission command today involves increasing interaction and synergy
between commanders. For contemporary mission command, education
and shared concepts are required so commanders at every level are
oriented to the systemic effects of their local decisions. In contrast
with the individualistic practice of the last century, mission command
today involves collectivism with commanders united around common
definitions and a shared consciousness.

Two Case Studies

Although a transformation is clearly recognized, there is a lack
of detailed analysis about mission command today. This is somewhat
anomalous since, with the long-running campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is extensive evidence on which to draw. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, modern mission command was repeatedly demonstrated by
a number of commanders. Indeed, the practice is thoroughly ingrained
into the US Army and Marine Corps. There is an embarrassment of
evidence. This article draws upon some of this material. In an article
of this length, however, the empirical analysis must be limited.
Consequently, it is impossible to prove a transformation of command
definitively. The argument must, perforce, be indicative.
In this situation, rather than provide a generalized and descriptive
narrative, two particularly well-documented case studies will illustrate
this transformation of command: Lieutenant General Stanley
McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
in Baghdad (2003–2008), and Major General James Mattis, commander
of 1st Marine Division during the invasion of Iraq (2003). McChrystal
and Mattis practiced mission command in Iraq, constructing novel
systems of command for the challenges of contemporary operations.
They commanded very different organizations. The 1st Marine Division
conducted conventional maneuver warfare; JSOC, counterterrorism
missions. Consequently, identifying a compatible practice of command
in both headquarters would seem to be evidentially significant.
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Moreover, both generals have another advantage: McChrystal has
written extensively about his headquarters while the United States Marine
Corps has documented Mattis’s command. Consequently, it is possible
to develop a sufficiently detailed understanding of their command
methods. These cases not only constitute valid evidence of the revision
of mission command but also exemplify its precise character. Of course
like all samples, McChrystal and Mattis may be outliers, which cannot be
refuted here. Since the two studies corroborate each other, however, they
suggest the transition might be a much wider phenomenon—mission
command has become an increasingly collective practice.
McChrystal’s writings describe how, like other organizations, the
armed forces have been radically challenged by new global threats.
In particular, the hierarchies, developed in the twentieth century for
industrial warfare and in which classical mission command emerged,
have become increasingly obsolete. Twentieth-century warfare was
complicated, involving the coordination of massive forces. This task was
administratively demanding—a mistake could be catastrophic—but
missions were relatively simple. In contrast, twenty-first century military
problems have become heterogeneous and, above all, complex: “the
number of interactions between components increases dramatically—the
interdependencies that allow viruses and bank runs to spread; this is
where things quickly become unpredictable.”21
In Iraq, McChrystal discovered traditional methods of command
were ill-adapted for complex operations and constructed a new network:
“We had to unlearn a great deal of what we thought we knew about
how war—and the world—worked. We had to tear down familiar
organizational structures and rebuild them along completely different
lines, swapping our sturdy architecture for organic fluidity, because it
was the only way to confront a rising tide of complex threats.”22
The most important element in this network was McChrystal’s
command team itself. Here, traditional models of leadership had become
obsolete and obstructive: “The heroic ‘hands-on’ leader whose personal
competence and force of will dominated battlefields and boardrooms
for generations had been overwhelmed by accelerating speed, swelling
complexity, and interdependence.”23 Yet, the mission command
McChrystal introduced was also quite novel. In order to realize this
intent, McChrystal did not merely devolve decision-making authority
to subordinates who acted on their own initiative. He had to create a
“shared consciousness” which “helped us understand and react to the
interdependence of the battlefield.”24
One of the central means by which McChrystal created shared
consciousness was the daily Operations and Intelligence Brief, at which
representatives from every involved agency would share their assessment
of the campaign. This brief was “a relatively small video teleconference
between our rear headquarters at Fort Bragg, a few DC officers and our
biggest bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Quickly, though, that audience
21 Stanley A. McChrystal with Tantum Collins, David Silverman and Chris Fussell, Team of
Teams: New Rules of Engagement (New York: Portfolio / Penguin, 2015), 57.
22 Ibid., 20.
23 Ibid., 231.
24 Ibid., 202.
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grew”; “In time, people came to appreciate the value of systemic
understanding. O&I attendance grew as the quality of information and
interaction grew. Eventually we had seven thousand people attending
almost daily for two hours.”25
McChrystal saw the briefing as the principal means of generating
shared consciousness and therefore exercising a new form of mission
command. Indeed, he actively adopted certain practices to encourage
this sense of collective participation and shared cognition: “I adopted
a practice I called ‘thinking aloud’ in which I would summarize what
I’d heard.” “Thinking out loud can be a frightening prospect for a
senior leader” as it risks exposing ignorance and uncertainty. Yet, in
the context of JSOC, it had a salutary command effect: “The overall
message reinforced by the O&I was that we have a problem that only we
can understand and solve.”26
McChrystal recognized that even as a commander, he could not
know everything:
“Being woken to make life-or-death decisions confirmed my role as a leader,
and made me feel important and needed—something most managers yearn
for. But it was not long before I began to question my value to the process.
Unless I had been tracking the target the previous night, I would usually
know only what the officers told me that morning. . . . My inclusion was
a rubber stamp that slowed the process, and sometimes caused us to miss
fleeting opportunities.”27

Accordingly, McChrystal implemented a heightened form of mission
command in JSOC, empowering commanders at the local level to
prosecute missions—but always in line with the collective consciousness
of the organization. McChrystal specifically drew on the example of
British Naval Commander Horatio Nelson who
“had told his commanders ‘No captain can do very wrong if he places his
ship alongside that of the enemy,’ but that broad authority could have gone
terribly wrong if he had not spent decades cultivating their individual qualities as decision makers, and if they had lacked an overall understanding of
the force and the battle as a whole. This was Nelson’s equivalent of shared
consciousness, and it was only because of that his captains could thrive as
empowered agents in a chaotic mêlée.”28

Although McChrystal mentions the “individual qualities of
decision-makers,” it is important to note that he does not use Nelson as
an exemplar of laissez-faire mission command. On the contrary, in Iraq,
McChrystal created a federation of commanders, linked together in a
closely integrated network, able to cue actions reflecting the collective
goals. His subordinates exercised their individual qualities as decisionmakers precisely insofar as they were already members of an integrated
team: “The term ‘empowerment’ gets thrown around a great deal in the
management world, but the truth is simply taking off constraints is a
dangerous move. It should be done only if the recipients of newfound
authority have the necessary sense of perspective to act on it wisely.”

25
26
27
28

Ibid., 164, 168.
Ibid., 229.
Ibid., 202.
Ibid., 215.
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To distribute command authority accordingly but to retain
simultaneously unity of command, McChrystal developed a policy of
“Eyes On, Hands Off.” He monitored his subordinates, confirming they
were acting in line with his intent without seeking to manage them.
McChrystal both liberated his subordinates and drew them into an ever
closer relationship with him and their colleagues. In this way, decisionmaking at every level was closely synchronized. Using a new lexicon
of terms like “shared consciousness” and “empowerment,” McChrystal
adapted and advanced existing concepts of mission command. In place
of individual license, he created a professional team whose members
were mutually oriented to collective intentionality.
It might be argued McChrystal was only able to adopt this distinctively
collective system of command because of technological imperatives. He
enjoyed the most advanced communications and information system of
any US commander in history. In fact, while digital communications and
surveillance were certainly not irrelevant to McChrystal, his command
method cannot be reduced to mere technology. On the contrary,
digital technology potentially allowed McChrystal to operate a highly
centralized, directive system precisely because real-time, high-fidelity
video feeds were available to him. By contrast, he actively constructed
a confederated system. He employed technology not to oversee his
subordinates but to unite their activities and to coordinate their
decision-making, forming a tightly articulated but flexible network. The
technology was not employed to eliminate individualism—as it could
have been—but rather to develop an integrated command community.
Although the operational conditions in which Mattis was
working were quite different, he did something very similar with the
1st Marine Division. Instructively, while McChrystal’s command
system exploited the most advanced digital technology available to
US forces, Mattis’s division notably lacked information technology. It
was eventually supplied with Blue Force Tracker equipment, but the
division constructed its own ad hoc communications system before the
operation with procured commercial videophones, video teleconference
suites, and Iridium phones.29 The relative paucity of the 1st Marine
Division’s information and communication technology suggests that
while digital communications have certainly assisted the revision of
mission command, it cannot be reduced to them. Contemporary mission
command represents a transformation in professional expertise and
practice, not merely available technology.
Like McChrystal, Mattis consciously implemented the doctrine
of mission command, laid out in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
1, Warfighting:30 “His style of command is a function of the mission
concept from army and marine maneuver warfare laid out in Warfighting.
He follows those tenets ‘to a T.’ It is all about intent and guidance.
Everything that can possibly be done by direct communications with
commanders should be done that way—through his intent and guidance.
Opportunities are fleeting and you have to make sure that commanders
are in a position not to have to second guess their decisions (i.e. to require
29 Michael S. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy
(Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), 83–86.
30 Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1
(Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997), 50.
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direction from above).”31 Indeed, Mattis consciously understood himself
to be implementing the precepts of mission command: “Commander’s
intent is straight out of Marine Corps doctrine, as written by Al Gray, 10
years ago. It demands a higher level of discipline.”32
The commander’s intent was central to Mattis’s method of
command.33 Crucially, Mattis established speed as the center of gravity for
the 1st Marine Division in his intent and impressed its importance upon
all his subordinates; indeed, one of his regimental team commanders
was removed precisely because he failed to implement this principle.
Unless the division could quickly react in Baghdad and depose Saddam
Hussein, the operation would deplete its supplies and potentially generate
regional and international political opposition.
Moreover, the commander’s intent was only as effective as Mattis’s
subordinates understood, accepted, and implemented it. Following the
precepts of Warfighting, it was here that Mattis demonstrated his greatest
skill.34 Mattis invested great effort in creating a command fraternity
able to enact his intent. Before deploying to Iraq, Mattis issued his
“Commanding General’s Staff Guidance” to his regimental and battalion
commanders, his division principals, and special staff. The guidance was
also communicated orally in a series of visits to his units; indeed, the
guidance constituted his notes for his briefing. It is a deeply interesting
document which provides a privileged insight into the way he built a
command team in the 1st Marine Division.
One of the most important principles was the equality of all
commanders in the division. Radically, Mattis stressed: “All of us are
[Marine Air Ground Task Force] MAGTF leaders.” Unusually, Mattis
believed all commanders, at whatever level, were distinctive. They
constituted a special status group within the division, unified by their
decision-making responsibilities. He worked hard to create a special
relationship with each of his subordinate commanders down to battalion
and even company level. Later in the guidance, he elaborated upon the
point: “Accused of making subordinate commanders my equal—that is
good—I stand guilty. I don’t need to call the plays so long as the plays
will gain my endstate/intent. I don’t want subordinates on a string like
puppets, but I expect them to energetically carry out my intent.”35
An officer who was a battalion commander with the 1st Marine
Division in Iraq and subsequently worked on Mattis’s staff noted the
difference: “With the relationship commander to commander, you have
responsibility. You are placed there for the commander. He gives you his
will, personality, force—and trust. That was not his relationship with
his staff. It is much more demanding to work for him as staff. It was a
privilege to be both. But he had a different relationship with his staff.”36
31 Colonel Clarke Lethin, (assistant chief of staff, G-3, 1st Marine Division), interview with
author, July 19, 2016.
32 General James Mattis, interview, January 23, 2004.
33 Michael L. Valenti, The Mattis Way of War: An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force
58 and 1st Marine Division (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College
Press, 2014), 48.
34 HQMC, Warfighting, 51.
35 James Mattis, “Commanding General’s Staff Guidance,” 1st Marine Division, Camp
Pendleton, August 14, 2002, 4.
36 Interview with a marine, March 15, 2016.
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Specifically, Mattis sought to replace a traditional military hierarchy
with a unified team. Indeed, Mattis employed sporting metaphors to
communicate unity. Rather than directing operations from above, he
saw himself as a coach or perhaps a quarterback calling plays from
within the action, a first among equals rather than a superior. Naturally,
commanders in this team were not equal; however, mission command
was anything but a license for subordinates to do as they pleased: “Don’t
screw with higher commander’s intent, missions, tasks.”37
In order to generate a common consciousness among his
commanders, Mattis exploited standard planning methods such as the
drill Rehearsal of Concept (ROC). Of course, Mattis was in no way
unique in using sandtables, tactical models, or Rehearsal of Concept
drills to prepare his troops for battle. Models of this type had been used
at the division and corps level since the First World War and their use
at higher levels can be traced back to the late-eighteenth century. But
Mattis dramatically intensified their significance, consciously seeking to
draw his commanders together as a decision-making community.
Before the operation began in Iraq, the 1st Marine Division
conducted a series of Rehearsal of Concept drills.38 In August 2002,
when the division was first warned they were possibly deploying to Iraq,
Mattis decided to conduct a rehearsal maneuver on a scale model of Iraq
constructed in front of the “White House,” the division’s headquarters
building, with over 6,000 Lego blocks representing every vehicle in
the division. After arriving in Kuwait, the marines completed two
additional drills in the desert on February 7 and 27, 2002, using two large
Olympic swimming pool sized model sandpits made with bulldozers.39
Commanders wore distinctively colored football jerseys with the unit’s
call sign to distinguish the units from each other.
On the basis of these drills, Mattis and his staff were able to
draw definite deductions about plausible and impractical schemes of
maneuver—for instance, after formulating the invasion plan the division
learned Task Force Tarawa would be assigned to their area of operations
with a mission of securing its lines of communication around Nasiriyah.
Mattis opposed the order on the basis of the Lego drill:
“Adding Tarawa, which was crossing in front of the divisional line of march
and stopping in the middle of it; it was going to conflict with [Regimental
Combat Team One] RCT-1. It was going to create friction. We knew that
was going to occur but we didn’t know how much. We had covered that one
though. When we saw Task Force Tarawa briefing their move to the [Marine
Expeditionary Force] MEF, I said: ‘You won’t be able to do that. We are
on the main effort and you are now on the same road at the same time.’ ”40

This was an important episode: it showed the drills also allowed
leaders in the division to anticipate and practice decision-making. By
anticipating alternative scenarios, the two jersey drills allowed the 1st
Marine Division to predict when a decision might have to be taken
and, therefore, accelerating or even eliminating decision-making
37 Ibid., 4.
38 Groen, With the 1st Marine Division, 109–12, 126–8.
39 Lethin interview.
40 General James Mattis (commanding general, 1st Marine Division), interview with author,
June 4, 2016.
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during the actual operation. The identification of decision points was
indispensable to the application of mission command because the
points effectively presented subordinate commanders with anticipated
decisions. Subordinate commanders were already cued to the kinds of
situations they would face, the sorts of decisions which they might have
to make, and the way that General Mattis and the division wanted the
decisions to be made. The “commanders knew the second and third
order effects of their possible decisions, based on the commander’s
intent and guidance.”41
The ROC drills impressed Mattis’s intent upon commanders
collectively orienting them to a coherent pattern of action even when
they were not copresent. In order to facilitate accurate and coherent
decision-making in line with the commander’s intent, the 1st Marine
Division also deployed nominated staff officers to those decision points
in Iraq: “We gamed out where the friction points were likely to be.
Myself and Colonel Kennedy performed that function of the division.
We would be at the friction point, for instance, when the Division was
splitting on its line of march. I was free to roam to a friction point when
they needed someone there to assist.”42
Mattis’s method of command was by no means original. Indeed,
Mattis himself has denied he was doing anything novel at all. Most of
the techniques he employed like his intent, building a command team,
and using models were all well-established practices; however, Mattis
intensified these methods to such a degree that the mission command he
exercised in Iraq was of a different order to the ad hoc decentralization
typical of the twentieth century. His subordinates did not act on their
individual initiative or instinct. Their decision-making was facilitated
insofar as they were all bound together in a highly developed team with
a shared understanding of the operation. In many cases, the decisions
subordinates “made” were in fact already anticipated and collectively
agreed upon in the course of the ROC drills. As Mattis emphasized,
this system of mission command demanded far more discipline and
professionalism; it no longer involved mere individual freedom and
independence. It stood in direct contrast to the Moltkean tradition.
In Iraq, McChrystal and Mattis explored new frontiers of command
under different operational conditions. Although they based their
methods of command on existing doctrine, they were, in fact, developing
novel practices of command. Specifically, both sought to create a dense
federation of commanders who shared a common understanding and
were closely united around the commander’s intent. Decision-making
was, therefore, collectively preconceived, aligned, and coordinated.
The McChrystal and Mattis methods of command were significant
developments of traditional Western concepts of mission command.
Although the principle of decentralized decision-making and
improvisation remained important, the practices involved articulating
different command levels and required a high level of professionalism—
commanders at each level were committed to a common understanding
of the operation. Consequently, McChrystal and Mattis did not enact
mission command by reference to their own immediate situation but
41 Ibid.
42 Lethin interview.
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rather by reference to the shared intentions of the wider force reinforced
by careful collective preparation, anticipation, and imaging reinforced by
constant interaction, communication, and feedback. Ironically, mission
command today requires intensifying the professional bonds between
commanders at each level so they are acutely attuned to each other; it
requires an accentuated shared consciousness. In this way, apparently
instinctive individual decisions are actually increasingly informed by the
collective, systemic expectations.
Although among the most gifted commanders of their generation,
McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual in implementing this intensified
system of mission command. Many other commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan engaged in similar practices—for instance, Mattis’s
superior Lieutenant General David Mckiernan, the Combined Forces
Land Component commander, implemented a very similar system. As
he prepared his forces for the invasion of Iraq, Mckiernan was careful to
anticipate decisions through the use of ROC drills and other techniques.
He was diligent in communicating his intent to his subordinate corps
and division commanders, including Mattis, to ensure unified and
coherent decision-making at every level. In particular, Mckiernan was
careful to engage in a series of face-to-face meetings with Lieutenant
General James T. Conway, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and Lieutenant
General William S. Wallace, V Corps, to rehearse their passage of lines
and to anticipate when a command intervention might and might not be
necessary.43 McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual.
Moreover, recent developments have only accentuated the methods
McChrystal and Mattis pursued. The US Army is currently implementing
a division-level system of mission command whereby a networked main
division headquarters remains in the continental United States, while
tactical command posts deploy. Mission command has many advantages,
reducing the vulnerability and logistical footprint of the division’s
headquarters; however, a dispersed command system of this type
requires higher levels of discipline, professionalism, and teamwork from
commanders and staff. Precisely because it is now radically distributed,
local decision-making cannot be autonomous. Rather, local commanders
must continually align their decision-making with the rest of the force
to ensure coherence across tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Mission Command 2.0 does not involve merely decentralizing vertical
hierarchy, but in fact, integrating a complex and heterogeneous network.

Conclusion

Mission command is indisputably a central precept in Western
military doctrine today; it is the professed method of command. It is also
true that when Western forces institutionalized mission command into
doctrine, they drew heavily on historical examples, especially from the
Wehrmacht in World War II. While recognizing continuity, this article
argues the changing character of operations and the expansion of the
span of control facilitated by new technologies deepens and intensifies
mission command into a highly distinctive phenomenon.

43 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers who served on Mckiernan’s staff for this
example.
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In particular, while traditional mission command might be
characterized as an individualistic system, giving local commanders
temporary independence to make immediate tactical decisions, Mission
Command 2.0 relies on a dense federation of commanders. It is
highly collective. It aligns and coordinates decisions across command
echelons. It unites commanders into dense, professional communities,
whose members are intimately and constantly attuned to each other’s
intentions and situations. Ironically, to increase the tempo and accuracy
of decision-making, Mission Command 2.0 involves not the increased
independence of subordinate commanders but radical interdependence.

